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Cleaning Up the Muck 
A TAKINGS ANALYSIS OF THE MORATORIUM ON 
DEEPWATER DRILLING FOLLOWING THE BP OIL 
SPILL 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon drilling 
platform exploded in the Gulf of Mexico. The blast killed eleven 
workers and triggered the worst oil spill in America’s history.1 
The platform was owned by Transocean Services, Ltd., and was 
under lease to British Petroleum, PLC (BP), for the purpose of 
drilling an exploratory well five thousand feet below the ocean’s 
surface off the coast of Louisiana.2 Aside from the unfortunate 
deaths of the workers, another tragedy unfolded as it became 
clear that the spill could not be stopped for weeks or even 
months. Around-the-clock video feeds of the oil spewing from the 
leak showed viewers the enormity of the disaster, capturing the 
hearts and interest of the nation.3 It was estimated that over two 
hundred million gallons escaped from the leaking well before it 
was finally capped in mid-July.4 The environmental effects on 
the region’s wildlife⎯and on the people who depended on that 
wildlife for their subsistence⎯were staggering.5  
  
 1 See Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 
(E.D. La. 2010). 
 2 Andrea Chambers & Jerry Brown, The 2010 Gulf Oil Spill and Questions 
of Liability, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Aug. 25, 2010, available at 2010 
Emerging Issues 5281.  
 3 In fact, the oil spill was the most searched-for term in Yahoo’s search 
engine in 2010, the first time since 2005 that a celebrity had not topped the list. 
Michael Liedtke, BP Oil Spill Swamps Yahoo Search Engine in 2010, YAHOO!FINANCE, 
(Dec. 1, 2010, 7:54 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/BP-oil-spill-swamps-Yahoo-apf-
1847949440.html?x=0&.v=6.  
 4 Editorial, Gulf Leak Is Over, Impacts Still Uncertain, DAY (New London, 
Conn.), Sept. 22, 2010. To put this astronomical number in perspective, the infamous 
Exxon Valdez disaster that occurred off the coast of Alaska in 1989 resulted in a spill of 
about eleven million gallons. David Dipino, Researcher Warns that Current Could Still 
Bring Oil to the Area, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Sept. 8, 2010, at 1. 
 5 Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 630 n.2 (“As a result [of the spill], nearly one-
third of the Gulf of Mexico has been closed to commercial and recreational fishing.”). 
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Following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, it became 
immediately apparent that a prolonged oil leak posed a 
significant threat to wildlife living in and near the Gulf of 
Mexico. The region “is home to more than 400 marine and 
coastal fish and wildlife species,” including five endangered 
species of sea turtle, a variety of birds such as brown pelicans 
and terns, and several marine mammals including sperm 
whales and bottlenose dolphins.6 Additionally, it is the largest 
spawning ground in the world for blue fin tuna.7 About a month 
after the spill began, more than seven hundred dead animals 
had already been collected from the Plaquemines, Jefferson, 
and Lafourche parishes of Louisiana alone.8 Unlike beach goers 
and bathers in the area, many animals were ill-equipped or 
unable to avoid exposure to the spill.9 One expert expressed 
concern over the potential threat to the reproductive 
capabilities of fish in the area, noting, “Fish can swim away 
from the oil spill . . . , but eggs and larvae cannot.”10 Even 
worse, sea turtles in the area were observed attempting to feed 
on the tar balls that were prevalent in the Gulf.11  
Aside from those animals affected by direct exposure to 
the oil, the damage the spill caused to the marine and coastal 
habitat also posed more long-term, indirect threats. The salt 
marshes and mangrove coastlines that make up the wetlands 
surrounding the Gulf were described as practically impossible to 
clean without doing additional damage.12 Coast Guard Admiral 
  
 6 Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO, 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n).  
 7 Dipino, supra note 4. 
 8 Kia Hall Hayes, Coalition Asks BP to Allocate $750million: Money for 
Economic Losses, Seafood Safety, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, May 30, 2010. 
 9 See Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO, Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n). For example, young sea turtles were described as “prone to being 
poisoned or coated by the sticky oil.” Id. Their adult counterparts fared no better as they 
“show[ed] no natural avoidance behaviors when confronted with an oil slick” and those 
that remained in the affected area often suffered from malnutrition. Id. Likewise, birds 
that tried to cope with their exposure to the spill by grooming the oil out of their feathers 
often exacerbated their problems by inadvertently consuming more oil in the process. Id.  
 10 Dipino, supra note 4. 
 11 Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO, 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n).  
 12 Matthew Brown, Cleaning Oil-Soaked Wetlands May Be Impossible, Scientists 
Say, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 22, 2010), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/ 
2010/05/cleaning_oil-soaked_wetlands_m.html; see also Bruce Barcott, Forlorn in the 
Bayou, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 2010), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2010/10/gulf-
oil-spill/barcott-text.  
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Thad Allen, in charge of the federal effort to clean up the spill, 
described oil in the wetland marshes as a “worst-case scenario.”13 
These wetlands are essential to the water quality of estuaries, 
with 98 percent of the fish and shellfish of the Gulf relying on 
them for food, shelter, and breeding.14 The potential danger was 
even more ominous considering that “[m]ore than 20 years after 
the Exxon Valdez spill, oil can still be found on Alaska’s beaches, 
and many species have not completely recovered.”15  
In addition to the perils facing the wildlife and the 
environment, the spill was particularly alarming for those 
people involved in Louisiana’s seafood, tourism, and recreation 
industries, which bring in almost $4 billion each year.16 Even 
with the spill barely a month old, and before pictures of the 
coastal impact inundated the American household, USA Today 
found that 13 percent of people polled would not eat any seafood 
that originated in the Gulf.17 Adding to these fears was a concern 
that the aggressive cleanup efforts might actually increase the 
damage to seafood and the environment in general.18 The 
chemical dispersants being used were of particular concern.19 
The dispersants used by BP to break up and dissolve the oil 
were assumed to be safe, but, alarmingly, the long-term health 
and environmental effects are still not well known.20 
Additionally, while the use of dispersants may be an effective 
means for hastening the degradation of oil, it also “increases the 
  
 13 Brown, supra note 12. 
 14 See Barcott, supra note 12.  
 15 Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO, Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n). The larger population size and greater importance of the Gulf of Mexico to the 
national economy was another reason the impact and liability of the BP spill was predicted to 
be much greater than that of the Exxon Valdez. Jonathan Stempel, Special Report: BP Oil 
Spill a Gusher for Lawyers, REUTERS (June 30, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/ 
30/us-oil-spill-bp-liability-idUSTRE65T2MZ20100630. One expert noted that “[t]his is not 
an attenuated 38,000 people on the coast of Alaska 4,000 miles away. Harms are likely 
to be larger, with a population more than 100 times greater in the impact zone and 
much larger economies and coastal ecosystems.” Id. 
 16 Hayes, supra note 8.  
 17 Id. 
 18 Kate Kelland, Analysis: Doing Nothing Might Have Been Best for Oil Spill, 
REUTERS (June 28, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/28/us-oil-spill-
scientists-analysis-idUSTRE65R5RC20100628.  
 19 “BP used an estimated 2 million gallons of the chemical dispersant Corexit 
to break up oil, both on the surface and deep underwater near the gushing well.” Sandi 
Doughton, Seattle’s NOAA Operation Testing Safety of Gulf Seafood, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 2010. According to the Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, 
“One of the greatest unaddressed concerns associated with the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill is [chemical] dispersant contamination of the seafood consumed by the public.” Id.  
 20 Id.  
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risk that aquatic life in the water and on the sea floor will be 
exposed to oil . . . and add yet more inherently toxic chemicals to 
the already toxic oil.”21 The federal government acknowledged 
this potential danger, at one point ordering BP to “identify and 
use a less toxic and more effective dispersant.”22 Even without 
proof of actual contamination or danger, the enormous amount 
of media coverage discussing possible contamination resulted in 
a general consumer aversion to seafood from the Gulf that, in 
turn, destroyed the economic prospects of many of those who 
relied on the seafood industry in the region.23 
In response to the spill, the White House issued a 
moratorium on all oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico and the 
Pacific Ocean.24 Critics argued that this action did nothing more 
than exacerbate the impact on the region by creating another 
class of employees to stand in the unemployment line, namely 
those who rely on the energy industry.25 As a result⎯much like 
the blobs of oil that arrived on beaches hundreds of miles from 
their source⎯the legal consequences quickly spread throughout 
the country, touching the lives of thousands of people.26 In 
addition to the seemingly endless procession of environmental 
liability lawsuits facing BP, companies and individuals in the 
industry⎯who were innocent in causing the spill but who felt 
they were being punished or forced to suffer 
nonetheless⎯brought litigation against the federal government.27 
One of these cases was Hornbeck Offshore Services L.L.C. v. 
Salazar, in which a group of offshore oil and gas drilling support 
  
 21 Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO, 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n).  
 22 Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, BP Must Use Less Toxic Dispersant 
(May 20, 2010).  
 23 Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO, 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n). For instance, “[i]n Hopedale, Louisiana, people who typically 
make their living from the bounty of the sea are now standing in unemployment lines, 
waiting for relief.” Id.  
 24 Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 (E.D. 
La. 2010). 
 25 See Siobhan Hughes & Stephen Power, New Ban Hits Oil Drillers, WALL 
ST. J. (July 12, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870428820457536 
2862315524690.html. 
 26 A former chairman of the Alaska Oil Spill Commission’s legal task force 
after the Exxon Valdez disaster estimated that BP’s clean up and legal liability costs 
could reach as high as $90 billion. Stempel, supra note 15. The quantity of lawsuits 
involved in the BP litigation is expected to become so large that it has even been 
compared to asbestos and tobacco litigation. Id.  
 27 See First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief at ¶ 89(b), Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 10-1663).  
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and service providers located in the Gulf sued the government, 
claiming that the overly broad moratorium unjustly deprived 
them of their service contracts with oil exploration companies 
unassociated with the spill.28 Further, they claimed that the 
damage was potentially irreparable if those exploration 
companies permanently left the Gulf for other waters as a 
result of the moratorium.29  
Certainly, quick government action was required to stop 
and then clean up the leaking oil and to punish those who 
caused the spill. But the broad and dramatic oil-drilling 
moratorium, and its subsequent detrimental impact on the oil 
industry in the Gulf, illustrates the dangerous potential of 
reactive government regulation that forces innocent parties to 
bear a burden more rightly placed on others. Protection against 
this threat can be found in the takings clause of the United 
States Constitution. Accordingly, this note will focus on a 
takings claim that was briefly mentioned but never fully 
argued or ruled on in Hornbeck30 to show that such a claim 
should provide a valid recourse for future oil industry plaintiffs 
affected by federal regulations in response to oil spills. 
Moratoria impose uniquely detrimental burdens on service 
industry entities that rely on property interests with a definite 
life span. Incorporating these burdens into a traditional 
takings analysis will deter the federal government from 
passing moratoria that are too rash or broad. At a minimum, 
such an application would provide a compensation mechanism 
to those who suffer as a result of moratoria that are necessary 
but nonetheless detrimental. Accordingly, a court applying a 
takings analysis to a factual situation similar to the events 
that unfolded in Hornbeck should find that a taking occurred 
and that compensation must be paid⎯despite an unwillingness 
to come to such a holding in the past.  
Part I of this note discusses the government’s response 
to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Part II analyzes the legal 
  
 28 Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 632.  
 29 Id. at 638. 
 30 See Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Application for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 33, Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 
10-1663(F)(2)); First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 91; Diamond Offshore’s Brief in Support of 
Emergency Motion to Intervene at ¶ 11, Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 10-
1663(F)(2)). Instead of focusing on the takings claim, the bulk of the plaintiffs’ 
argument and the focus of the court rested on grounds that the moratorium was invalid 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it was arbitrary and capricious. 
See Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 636-38.  
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proceedings stemming from the Hornbeck plaintiffs’ lawsuit 
against the federal government. Part III describes the history of 
the takings claim in order to frame the proper regulatory 
takings analysis for the oil-drilling moratorium. Part IV 
presents previous examples of federal government action that 
affected the property rights of legitimate leaseholders to explore 
and drill for oil on their property, and describes the litigation 
that arose from it. Part V applies current takings jurisprudence 
to determine whether the moratorium in Hornbeck amounted to 
a Fifth Amendment taking of property that required just 
compensation. Finally, this note concludes by arguing that 
Hornbeck further demonstrates that, while takings 
jurisprudence remains seriously muddled, case law on the 
subject provides at least theoretical latitude for plaintiffs to 
bring takings challenges against federal moratoria. Further, the 
conclusion asserts that the courts have been too conservative in 
their analysis of temporary takings and that the oil-drilling 
moratorium presents a factual scenario where fairness and 
justice require a more liberal and inclusive takings analysis.  
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
The government took decisive action in response to the 
unprecedented environmental disaster caused by the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion. President Obama formed a bipartisan 
commission dubbed the National Commission on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 
(Commission).31 The Commission consisted of a seven-member 
team led by former Florida governor and former U.S. senator 
Bob Graham and former Environmental Protection Agency 
administrator William Reilly.32 It was tasked with “investigating 
the facts and circumstances concerning the cause of the 
blowout.”33 Investigations are still ongoing at the time of this 
writing, but it has been estimated that BP’s civil and criminal 
liabilities for long-term restoration of the Gulf will likely exceed 
$15 billion34 and could balloon as high as $90 billion.35  
  
 31 Juliet Eilperin & Madonna Lebling, Digging Deep After the Oil Spill, 
WASH. POST, July 12, 2010, at A6.  
 32 Eilperin & Lebling, supra note 31.  
 33 Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 630. 
 34 John M. Broder, Panel Wants BP Fines to Pay for Gulf Restoration, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010, at A17. In addition to the investigation by the Commission, 
several other investigations commenced. Eilperin & Lebling, supra note 31. These 
included investigations by the Marine Board of Investigation to identify the factors 
leading to the explosion, the House Energy and Commerce Committee to determine the 
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In addition to the various investigations into the causes 
of and liabilities for the spill,36 President Obama ordered the 
Secretary of the Interior, Kenneth Salazar, to report and 
recommend any additional precautions and regulations that 
should be required to improve the safety of oil exploration and 
production on the outer continental shelf.37 The examination 
was conducted by the Department of the Interior in conjunction 
with a panel of experts from various levels of “state and federal 
governments, academic institutions, and industry and advocacy 
organizations.”38 After a thirty-day examination, the White 
House issued a report39 (Report) purportedly based on the 
panel’s findings and ordered a six-month moratorium halting 
all offshore exploratory drilling in depths of more than five 
hundred feet of water.40  
The moratorium met with sharply divided reviews from 
politicians and the media alike. Supporters argued the 
moratorium was necessary because the government simply 
could not risk the possibility of another spill.41 Among these 
supporters was Representative Edward Markey of 
Massachusetts, who noted, “The only thing worse than one oil 
  
extent and impact of the oil spill and BP’s response to it, the House Natural Resources 
Committee to determine problems in the Mineral Management Service’s (MMS) 
oversight over offshore drilling, and the National Academy of Engineering, which was 
charged with independently assessing the cause of the accident. Id.  
 35 Stempel, supra note 15. For its own part, BP has estimated that $40 billion 
should cover its liabilities for the spill. Tom Bergen, Special Report: How BP’s Oil Spill 
Costs Could Double, REUTERS (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/ 
01/us-special-report-how-bps-oil-spill-cost-idUSTRE6B02PA20101201. However, this 
number has been disputed as overly optimistic and as an attempt to underestimate the 
costs. Id. Instead, an analysis by Reuters stated that the “fines, damages, costs related 
directly to the leak, compensation and the damage to BP’s business suggests the final 
spill bill could, over the long term, end up [being] twice as much.” Id.  
 36 Eilperin & Lebling, supra note 31.  
 37 Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 630. 
 38 Id. at 630-31.  
 39 DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES FOR ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/ 
deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33598.  
 40 Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 631-32. The Report specifically directed the 
suspension of “all pending, current, or approved offshore drilling operations of new 
deepwater wells in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific regions.” Id. A Notice to Lessees 
(NTL) subsequently followed the Report, indicating that the MMS would not consider any 
drilling permits for deepwater wells for six months and defining deepwater as depths 
greater than five hundred feet. Id. See generally DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS 
MGMT. SERV., NTL No. 2010-N04, NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL 
AND GAS LEASES IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF REGIONS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO 
AND THE PACIFIC TO IMPLEMENT THE DIRECTIVE TO IMPOSE A MORATORIUM ON ALL 
DRILLING OF DEEPWATER WELLS (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/ 
pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33716.  
 41 Hughes & Power, supra note 25. 
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rig in the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico would be two oil rigs in 
the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico.”42 Likewise, Senator Bill 
Nelson praised the moratorium stating, “Until we know what 
happened with the Deepwater Horizon, and we’ll know very 
soon, it makes sense not to put Gulf Coast residents and the 
economies there at further risk.”43 The economic consequences 
of the moratorium on the Gulf Coast region, particularly on the 
oil industry, were acknowledged by supporters but seen as a 
necessary evil to prevent additional future harm.44  
Critics of the moratorium saw the situation 
dramatically differently, finding the undeniably immense 
economic consequences impossible to ignore in a region still 
recovering from Hurricane Katrina.45 One estimate predicted 
the moratorium would cause a nationwide loss of over twelve 
thousand jobs, $2.8 billion in economic activity, and $219 
million in tax revenue.46 Further, critics worried that drilling 
companies currently located in the Gulf, or in the process of 
applying for a future lease to drill, would instead leave for 
foreign countries rather than wait for the moratorium to end.47 
Once gone, the concern was that drilling companies would “not 
return for several years, if ever.”48 The long-term effects on the 
national economy and scientific progress were lamented as 
being equally dire.49  
  
 42 Ann Woolner, Editorial, Overreaching Times Two: A Judge Goes Too Far to 
Overturn a Deepwater Drilling Moratorium that Went Too Far, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, June 25, 2010 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 43 Hughes & Power, supra note 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Bill Sasser, Obama Loses in Court Again over Deepwater Drilling Moratorium, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 9, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0709/Obama-
loses-in-court-again-over-deepwater-drilling-moratorium. Other critics noted, “The Obama 
Administration’s immediate policy response to the oil spill, a categorical ban on all 
deepwater offshore drilling, had as much to do with managing public relations as with 
managing drilling policy based on sound science.” Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Transparency, Accountability, and Competency: An Essay on the Obama Administration, 
Google Government, and the Difficulties of Securing Effective Governance, 65 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 449, 456 (2011). 
 46 Rebecca Mowbray, Moratorium to Resound Across U.S., Expert Says, NEW 
ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, July 20, 2010.  
 47 Hughes & Power, supra note 25. The CEO of Diamond Offshore, one of the 
plaintiffs in Hornbeck, told a presidential commission that his company had already sent 
two deepwater rigs to foreign waters as a result of the moratorium, and warned that “there 
won’t be much of a U.S. industry left” if the moratorium remains in place. Id.  
 48 Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 6, Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. 
La. 2010) (No. 10-1663) . 
 49 Rebecca Terrell, Oil Leak Outrage, 26 NEW AMERICAN, July 19, 2010, 
available at 2010 WLNR 15967962. One senator even compared the moratorium to “the 
aftermath of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant disaster . . . that brought all 
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II. LEGAL FALLOUT 
The moratorium also sparked significant legal debate. 
On the extreme end of the spectrum, the moratorium was 
condemned as everything from a blatant executive overreach 
lacking reason and spurred by fear,50 to an unconstitutional 
regulation of commerce by the executive branch in violation of 
the separation of powers.51 Armchair debaters aside, there are 
real and tangible legal issues stemming from the actions of the 
federal government in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon 
accident. On June 7, 2010, Hornbeck Offshore Services, L.L.C. 
(Hornbeck) filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana against the Secretary, the 
Department of the Interior, the Minerals Management Service 
(MMS), and the Director of the MMS seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief to end the moratorium.52 Subsequently, 
additional plaintiffs joined the litigation.53 Judge Martin 
Feldman, presiding over the case, issued a preliminary 
injunction against the enforcement of the moratorium.54 The 
court held that, based on the administrative record, the blanket 
moratorium on all drilling wells of more than five hundred feet 
of water was likely to be found “arbitrary and capricious” and 
was thus invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) and the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act (OCSLA) and 
its implementing regulations.55 The following section will 
further explore that decision.  
A. The Hornbeck Decision 
Judge Feldman framed the issue to be decided in 
Hornbeck as “whether the federal government’s imposition of a 
general moratorium on deepwater drilling for oil in the Gulf of 
Mexico was imposed contrary to law.”56 The statutes governing the 
  
nuclear power plant applications to a screeching halt.” Id. The senator added, “In 
hindsight that was not the right decision. Today, we are 30 years behind the French in 
nuclear technology.” Id. 
 50 Woolner, supra note 42. 
 51 The Constitutionality of Obama’s Offshore Drilling Moratorium, 
YOUDECIDEPOLITICS.COM (June 22, 2010, 10:17 PM), http://www.youdecidepolitics.com/ 
2010/06/22/the-constitutionality-of-obamas-offshore-drilling-moratorium/. 
 52 Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 632. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 630. 
 55 Id. at 639. 
 56 Id. at 630. 
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outcome were OCSLA, which provides authority to the Secretary 
to suspend leases in the Gulf under certain circumstances,57 and 
the APA, which authorizes the federal courts to review final 
agency action.58 The plaintiffs generally alleged that the 
moratorium by the Secretary as well as the Notice to Lessees 
(NTL) implementing the moratorium were “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion and otherwise not in accordance with the 
APA, OCSLA and its implementing regulations.”59 Additionally, 
they made a brief allegation that the moratorium was an 
impermissible “‘taking’ of . . . property rights in violation of the 
5th Amendment to the United States Constitution.”60  
The focus of the plaintiffs’ complaint was directed at the 
arbitrary and capricious claim.61 They claimed that the 
moratorium was unwarranted based on the Report provided to 
the Secretary by a panel of experts.62 They alleged that the 
Secretary had exaggerated or entirely invented the experts’ 
support and recommendations for the moratorium.63 Further, 
they alleged the Secretary had failed to adequately explain the 
reasons behind the suspension of operations64 or why he had 
chosen a general depth limit of five hundred feet for the drilling 
ban.65 The plaintiffs pointed to a lack of individualized 
justification for the moratorium, stating, 
The Report itself does not contain any facts, data, analysis or risk 
assessment concerning why the Secretary imposed a Moratorium on 
further drilling by the “33 [existing] wells.” Twenty-nine of these 
  
 57 Id. at 632-33 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1)). 
 58 Id. at 634 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704). 
 59 First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 22. One of the expert panelists stated that if anybody had made 
the suggestion of a moratorium on existing drilling, “we’d have said that’s craziness.” 
Crude Politics, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2010 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60 Diamond Offshore’s Brief in Support of Emergency Motion to Intervene at 
4, Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 10-1663(F)(2)).  
 61 See generally First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27.  
 62 Id. ¶ 52.  
 63 Id. ¶ 83. At least some of this skepticism was confirmed when it “was exposed 
that an important White House official had changed the Safety Report before its public 
release, which created the misleading appearance of scientific peer review.” Hornbeck 
Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, No. 10-1663(F)(2), 2011 WL 454802, at *2 (E.D. La. 
Feb. 2, 2011).  
 64 Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 631. 
 65 The Deepwater Horizon operation was conducted at a depth of over five 
thousand feet. Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, supra note 48, at 10. The Report issued to the Secretary noted 
that, compared to drilling in shallow water, risks were greater after one thousand feet. 
First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 27, ¶ 89(d). 
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wells had been subjected to additional inspections following the 
Incident. According to the “MMS Deepwater Drilling Rig Inspection 
Report” . . . , issued on May 11, 2010, MMS found no violations of 
governing regulations or existing permit terms on 27 of the 29 
drilling rigs inspected and only minor violations on the two others. 
Further, each of the 33 rigs had previously satisfied the rigors of the 
MMS permitting process.66 
Additionally, they expressed concern about the injurious 
economic effects of the moratorium, exclaiming that “lost wages 
for direct and indirect jobs lost could be over $165 million to 
$330 million per month for every month the 33 platforms are 
idle.”67 The long-term effects were viewed as similarly alarming. 
The Report stated that the offshore operations provide 
employment for approximately 150,000 people.68 The 
moratorium put many of these jobs at risk. Further, without 
robust and continuous drilling activities, this labor force would 
lack incentive to remain in the region, thus reducing the ability 
of companies like the Hornbeck plaintiffs to find workers.69 
Finally, the plaintiffs also pointed to the possibility that the 
moratorium might actually last substantially longer than six 
months,70 an unacceptable possibility for an industry that relied 
on contracts and equipment with a limited useful life.71  
The government countered by citing the relevant portions 
of OCSLA that specifically authorize the Secretary to direct a 
suspension of drilling whenever it determines that “‘activities 
pose a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate harm or 
damage’ to human or animal ‘life, property, [ ] mineral deposit, 
or the marine, coastal, or human environment.’”72 The Secretary 
highlighted that the moratorium was needed to “address critical 
  
 66 First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 46. 
 67 Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, supra note 48, at 23. But see Woolner, supra note 42 (noting that “five days 
before filing suit, Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. assured the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the investing public that the ban would have little effect on it”). 
 68 First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 89a. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. ¶ 54. 
 71 Id. ¶¶ 93-98. Plaintiffs noted that they could lose as much as $500,000 per 
day for each rig while the moratorium remained in place. See Plaintiffs’ Original 
Complaint and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief at 
¶ 10, supra note 30. Additionally, some contractual parties were cancelling their 
contracts with plaintiffs altogether. First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 67. 
 72 Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 
6, Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010) 
(No. 10-1663(F)(2)) (quoting 30 C.F.R. § 250.172(b)).  
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spill containment and response deficiencies” and warned that 
there were “insufficient available response resources should 
another deepwater spill occur while the containment and clean 
up efforts [were ongoing] . . . .”73 The government pointed out 
that courts must defer to agency decisions that are supported by 
a thorough administrative record, and in this case, “the interim 
safety measures in the Safety Report and the corresponding 
suspension of deepwater drilling [were] appropriately supported 
by the Administrative Record.”74 The defendants spent little time 
addressing the Fifth Amendment takings claim, asserting only 
that it was “both wholly without merit and outside of the 
jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate.”75 
Judge Feldman issued his decision on June 22, 2010, 
holding that the moratorium was contrary to law and that he 
was “unable to divine or fathom a relationship between the 
findings and the immense scope of the moratorium.”76 He noted 
that the Report⎯supposedly the supporting basis for the 
moratorium⎯focused narrowly on the Deepwater Horizon 
incident alone.77 In contrast, the resulting moratorium was 
exceedingly broad, applying to rigs that had exemplary safety 
records and that drilled in significantly shallower water than 
the Deepwater Horizon.78 Judge Feldman found it hard to 
believe that such a suspension would be deemed appropriate in 
other contexts, asking, “If some drilling equipment parts are 
flawed, is it rational to say all are? Are all airplanes a danger 
because one was? All oil tankers like Exxon Valdez? All trains? 
All mines? That sort of thinking seems heavy-handed, and 
  
 73 Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 5, 
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 10-1663(F)(2)).  
 74 Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
supra note 72, at 16. The government argued that an agency’s investigation and choice 
of methodology are entitled to particularly broad deference when the agency is 
responding to an emergency. See id. 
 75 Defendants’ Response to Diamond Offshore’s Motion to Intervene at 3 n.4, 
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 10-1663(F)(2)).  
 76 Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 637. 
 77 See id. “[The Report] is incident-specific and driven: Deepwater Horizon 
and BP only. None others.” Id. 
 78 See id. at 637-38 & n.11; see also Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 48, at 10. The Deepwater 
Horizon well was drilled in nearly five thousand feet of water, and the Report addressed 
wells in depths greater than one thousand feet, yet the NTL set the moratorium at the 
significantly shallower depth of five hundred feet. Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 48, at 10.  
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rather overbearing.”79 Accordingly, the court held that the 
government’s actions in implementing the moratorium had 
been “arbitrary and capricious” and were thus contrary to the 
requirements of the APA and OSCLA.80 Therefore, the court 
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction 
preventing the moratorium from being enforced.81 Because the 
parties had failed to fully argue it, and perhaps to avoid 
entering the difficult and muddled jurisprudence of takings 
analysis, the court did not analyze or even mention the merits 
of the plaintiffs’ takings claim.82  
B. The Government’s Response to the Injunction 
The decision by Judge Feldman led to additional 
controversy surrounding the moratorium. Only days after the 
ruling, the Secretary publicly announced that the government 
was working on passing a second moratorium.83 The government 
reiterated this intention when⎯just hours before the district 
court’s decision was appealed before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit⎯a senior administration official 
announced that the government “would immediately issue a new 
moratorium” regardless of the outcome of the appeal.84 The 
maneuver sparked outrage from critics who claimed that the 
statements were made in a brazen attempt to intimidate the 
court.85 Nevertheless, on July 12, 2010, the Secretary issued a 
  
 79 Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 637. Also of import was the fact that since 
1969 there had only been three deepwater blowouts before the Deepwater Horizon, 
none of which were in the Gulf of Mexico. See id. at 638 n.11.  
 80 Id. at 639. The court was careful to note that “a suspension of activities 
directed after a rational interpretation of the evidence could outweigh the impact on 
the plaintiffs and the public” but that here the facts of the case could not support such 
a determination. Id.  
 81 See id.  
 82 See generally Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627. 
 83 Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint at 2, Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 10-1663(F)(2)). After the first 
injunction was ordered, the Secretary stated, “‘The decision to impose a moratorium on 
deepwater drilling was and is the right decision’ and that ‘I will issue a new order in 
the coming days that eliminates any doubt that a moratorium is needed, appropriate, 
and within our authorities.’” Id. at 5.  
 84 Id. at 6.  
 85 See Kingsley Guy, Op-Ed., Obama’s Over-Reach: President Remaking 
Courts, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), July 25, 2010, at F5 (comparing the 
Obama administration’s response to Judge Feldman’s injunction to the court packing of 
FDR and expressing that “[r]egardless of their views on offshore drilling, Americans 
should be concerned about the heavy-handed action by the Obama administration of 
reinstating a moratorium. It demonstrates contempt for the judicial system and the 
attitude of, ‘I’m the president and I can do anything I want.’”).  
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memorandum rescinding the first moratorium but ordering a 
new⎯yet similar⎯blanket suspension on offshore oil drilling.86 
Additionally, the government moved to dismiss the original suit 
on the grounds of mootness since the original moratorium was 
no longer in effect.87 Counsel for the plaintiffs, incensed by the 
government’s actions, invoked Marbury v. Madison and 
exclaimed that the decision to pass a new moratorium with the 
same practical effects as the now enjoined original one 
constituted executive interference with the judicial branch and 
the judicial review process.88  
The motion for dismissal was addressed on September 
1, 2010, when Judge Feldman again ruled against the 
government, holding that mootness did not apply and stating 
that the second moratorium was essentially the same as the 
first one.89 In addressing the issue of whether the Secretary had 
the authority to rescind the first moratorium, he noted that the 
proper procedure for an agency seeking to reconsider a decision 
that is under judicial review is for the agency to move the court 
to remand.90 The court voiced its concern that “if agencies are 
not required to move to remand, they may use rescission and 
reissuance of their decisions as a way to manipulate the federal 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.”91 Ultimately, Judge Feldman 
concluded the rescission did have “some administrative force,”92 
but this was not enough to save the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss. The court criticized their maneuvering, expressing 
that, “In reality, the new moratorium covers precisely the same 
rigs and precisely the same deepwater drilling in the Gulf of 
Mexico as did the first moratorium.”93 The court did not 
specifically decide whether the second moratorium was again 
  
 86 See Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, No. 10-1663(F)(2), 2010 
WL 3523040, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 1, 2010).  
 87 See id.  
 88 See Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint, supra note 83, at 16. “Simply put, the law does not allow for the 
manipulation of the ‘orderly operation of the federal judicial system,’ . . . .” Id. (quoting 
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994)). According to 
the plaintiffs, it did not matter how necessary or right the defendants believed their 
actions to be; instead, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must 
of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint, supra note 83, at 16 (quoting Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).  
 89 See Hornbeck, 2010 WL 3523040, at *1, *7-8.  
 90 See id. at *4-5.  
 91 Id. at *4.  
 92 Id.  
 93 Id. at *1.  
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arbitrary and capricious (the sole issue before the court was 
whether the case surrounding the first moratorium was now 
moot), but instead focused on whether the harm imposed by the 
first moratorium would also be imposed by the second.94 Under 
the voluntary cessation exception to mootness claims, a federal 
court will only find a case to be moot if the subsequent 
government action makes it clear that the initial harm could not 
reasonably be expected to recur.95 Judge Feldman noted that the 
government’s public announcements immediately following his 
initial ruling sharply undermined their argument that the second 
moratorium was based on a significantly supplemented 
administrative record.96 More importantly, these public 
announcements and posturing indicated that there was a 
reasonable expectation the harm to the plaintiffs could recur and 
thus the government’s repeal of the first moratorium did not 
render the action moot.97 Accordingly, Judge Feldman denied the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.98  
For some time, while the Hornbeck suit was underway, 
new litigation continued to emerge as a result of the 
moratorium. Additional plaintiffs brought claims that the 
moratorium had effectively ended drilling in shallow water 
located in entirely different parts of the country.99 But it now 
  
 94 See id. at *7. Defendants argued that the new moratorium was based on 
new information and a new administrative record and that by lifting the old 
moratorium all plaintiffs’ claims had become moot. See id. at *1.  
 95 See id. at *5. Plaintiffs argued that their claims were not moot because the 
new moratorium applied to the same rigs, in the same area, for the same amount of 
time, and thus the new moratorium would cause them the same harm as the old one. 
See id. at *2.  
 96 Id. at *7. Commenting on the Secretary’s announcement promising a 
second moratorium just moments after the first injunction was entered, the court 
stated, “It is difficult to square such public expressions of resoluteness, with the 
government’s assertion that its rescission of the first moratorium and its issuance of a 
new moratorium is entitled to solicitude and should not be considered litigation 
posturing.” Id. at *8. 
 97 Id. at *7. 
 98 Id. at *8.  
 99 Margaret Fisk, Alaska Claims in Suit U.S. Government Improperly 
Banned Off-Coast Drilling, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/print/2010-09-09/u-s-improperly-banned-drilling-off-alaska-coast-state-alleges-in-
lawsuit.html. For instance, the state of Alaska brought suit against the Secretary, 
Alaska v. Salazar, 3:10-cv-00205 (D. Alaska 2010), in early September 2010 claiming 
that the Secretary improperly banned drilling off the coast of Alaska following the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. No drilling permits have been issued in the Arctic since 
the incident, even though an Interior Department spokeswoman acknowledged that 
“[t]he moratorium is on deep-water drilling and there is no deep-water drilling in 
Alaska.” Id. Additionally, suits were also brought closer to the site of the spill. For 
example, Exxon Mobile Corporation sued the federal government in August 2011 
claiming that it was being deprived of its right to drill in the Julia field in the Gulf of 
Mexico, an area estimated to contain billions of barrels of oil. Jonathan Stempel, Exxon 
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appears that any formal need for the courts to enjoin the 
moratorium has largely passed; the moratorium was lifted on 
October 12, 2010, several weeks before it was scheduled to 
terminate.100 Following the lifting of the moratorium, the 
Hornbeck plaintiffs continued to evaluate their legal options, 
but it was generally believed that “this [was] a dispute that 
[had] run its course.”101 There was lingering concern, however, 
that a de facto moratorium remained in place.102 Todd Hornbeck 
(CEO of Hornbeck) stated, 
[T]he industry hasn’t seen the final requirements for what we would 
have to do to be able to actually get a permit issued. . . . Until that is 
done, lifting the moratorium may be just a moot or perfunctory 
act. . . . I’m skeptical that it will be anytime soon that permits will be 
issued . . . .103  
Critical politicians also exuded skepticism as to the 
practical effects of lifting the moratorium.104 These concerns 
proved to be legitimate. In a later decision on February 2, 2011, 
stemming from the Hornbeck litigation, Judge Feldman stated, 
“Still . . . no drilling permits have been issued for activities 
barred by [the moratorium] as of this date.”105 Indeed, more 
than a year after the spill, the offshore oil exploration and 
  
Sues U.S. to Reverse Offshore Ruling; Canceled Leases Estimated to Hold Billions of 
Barrels, NAT’L POST (Can.), Aug. 19, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16476759.  
 100 See Matthew Daly, Administration Lifts Freeze on Drilling, Official Says 
New Rules Improved Safety, Cut Risks of Another Disaster, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, 
Oct. 13, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 20480874.  
 101 Rebecca Mowbray, Moratorium Suits Become Moot, Hornbeck Takes Some 
Credit for Action, NEW ORLEANS TIME PICAYUNE, Oct. 13, 2010, available at 2010 
WLNR 20432013. Litigation stemming from the moratorium continued, however. For 
instance, in Hornbeck the plaintiffs would later file a claim seeking attorney’s fees and 
costs expended in an attempt to prevent the government from circumventing the first 
moratorium by passing a second nearly identical one. The plaintiffs prevailed on this 
claim and Judge Feldman, holding that the government had contemptuously ignored 
the injunction halting the first moratorium, eventually awarded the Hornbeck 
plaintiffs $528,801.18 in attorney’s fees and $444.33 in costs. Hornbeck Offshore 
Services, L.L.C. v. Salazar, 2011 WL 454802, at *1-3 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011); Hornbeck 
Offshore Services L.L.C. v. Salazar, 2011 WL 2516907, at *3 (E.D. La. June 23, 2011).  
 102 Daly, supra note 100.  
 103 Id. Likewise, the executive director of the Shallow Water Energy Security 
Coalition warned his colleagues about the practical effect of the ending of the 
moratorium, telling them that “as soon as they try to pop the champagne bureaucrats 
will be there to stick the cork back in the bottle.” Gerard Shields, Deep-Water Drilling 
Ban Lifted, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct. 13, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 204881285.  
 104 Daly, supra note 100. For example, Louisiana Senator Mary Landrieu 
placed a hold on a Senate vote to confirm President Obama’s nomination of Jacob Lew 
for head of the Office of Management and Budget until drilling activity actually 
resumed. Id.  
 105 Hornbeck, 2011 WL 454802, at *2. 
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production industry was only “slowly opening up once more” in 
the Gulf of Mexico.106  
The new regulations instituted “after the spill 
strengthened safety measures and reduced the risk of another 
catastrophic blowout.”107 But as the Secretary stated, “there will 
always be risks involved with deep water drilling.”108 Because 
future oil spills remain a likely possibility, it is necessary to 
clearly define the rights and responsibilities of the government 
in responding to these spills with blanket, albeit temporary, 
moratoria or similar regulations. Although the arbitrary and 
capricious arguments presented in Hornbeck proved to be an 
effective protection against an improper restriction of property 
rights, such claims provide better protection against a flawed 
decision-making process than they do against an unjust 
decision or result. Future problems may instead arise in 
circumstances where the government’s decision to implement a 
moratorium is supported by an adequate Administrative 
Record, limiting the protection provided by the APA. These 
situations pose a threat to innocent parties whose property 
rights are unfairly burdened by that moratorium. 
Alternatively, there may be situations where the circumstances 
require a proper moratorium but where notions of justice and 
fairness nonetheless require some form of compensation to 
those negatively affected. Accordingly, takings claims should 
serve to fill this gap in protection, even though historically they 
have met with little success.  
III. THE HORNBECK TAKINGS CLAIM IN THE CONTEXT OF 
TAKINGS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
Although the focus in Hornbeck began with a claim that 
the moratorium was arbitrary and capricious,109 the plaintiffs 
  
 106 John Shimkus, ExxonMobil Battles U.S. over Gulf Oil Discovery, 
ENERGYDIGITAL.COM (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.energydigital.com/oil_gas/exxonmobil-
battles-us-over-gulf-oil-discovery. 
 107 Daly, supra note 100.  
 108 Id. In addition to the Secretary’s acknowledgement of the inherent risk 
associated with deepwater drilling, a presidential panel reported to President Obama 
that absent significant reform in both the industry and the government’s policies, a 
similar oil spill “might well recur.” Wendy Koch, Panel Warns Gulf Oil Spill Could 
Happen Again, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ 
greenhouse/post/2011/01/panel-gulf-oil-spill-happen-again/1. 
 109 As previously discussed, see supra Part II.A, the court focused on the 
arbitrary and capricious allegations despite a takings claim briefly made by the 
plaintiffs. The court, in fact, did not mention any takings claim. The reason for this 
omission is unclear. 
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also briefly asserted that the moratorium constituted an 
unconstitutional taking of private property.110 Additionally, 
after joining the case in July 2010, Diamond Offshore alleged 
the following: 
By virtue of their actions, Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ rights 
under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. That 
amendment provides that no person shall suffer a “taking” of private 
property without due process of law or just compensation. As set 
forth above, the actions of Defendants herein constitute a taking of 
Plaintiffs’ contract rights without due process of the law for which 
Plaintiffs seek non-monetary relief.111 
The relevant provision of OSCLA requires the Secretary 
to manage the offshore leasing program, stating, “Leasing 
activities shall be conducted to assure receipt of fair market 
value for the lands leased and the rights conveyed by the 
Federal Government.”112 Certainly, the moratorium prevented 
leaseholders in the Gulf, even those operating safe rigs, from 
enjoying the fair market value of their property while the 
moratorium was in place. Undoubtedly, it can be said that 
much of this value in terms of access to the oil and gas was 
restored as soon as the moratorium was lifted, but this fails to 
account for the fact that entities in the oil industry rely on 
contracts and equipment that often have a limited lifespan. 
The industry as a whole was likewise threatened if oil rig 
operators and their crews chose to take their business to other, 
more business-friendly waters.113 
The defendants’ only response to the takings allegation 
was relegated to a footnote claiming that it should be 
“dismissed . . . because the second claim for relief, which 
purports to assert a Fifth Amendment Takings claim, is both 
  
 110 The Hornbeck takings claim may present procedural questions of ripeness 
and proper jurisdiction. These issues are outside the scope of this note, which will 
assume that future plaintiffs would properly address the concerns associated with 
them. See generally Robert Meltz, Inverse Condemnation and Related Government 
Liability, SC 43 ALI-ABA 57 (1998) (discussing common problems and obstacles arising 
in takings claims against the federal government).  
 111 Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Application for Temporary Restraining 
Order and Injunctive Relief, supra note 30, ¶ 33. Before Diamond Offshore joined 
Hornbeck, Hornbeck more generally alleged that the moratorium infringed on its 
property rights as protected by the Fifth Amendment but did not specify a takings 
claim. First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 91.  
 112 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4) (2006).  
 113 Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, supra note 48, at 6; Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Application for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, supra note 30, ¶ 34.  
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wholly without merit and outside the jurisdiction of this Court 
to adjudicate.”114 Yet, it appears that the issue may not be as cut 
and dry as the defendants asserted. Takings law is extremely 
unsettled and has been described as “both lacking in theory 
and unpredictable in application.”115 The United States 
Supreme Court has acknowledged as much, with Justice John 
Paul Stevens commenting that “[e]ven the wisest lawyers 
would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope 
of this Court’s takings jurisprudence.”116 This means that future 
court decisions are required to settle the area of takings law 
and that future plaintiffs have some latitude to persuade these 
courts to expand the protections afforded by the takings clause. 
Because future cases may not involve factual circumstances 
amenable to alternative legal remedies such as the arbitrary 
and capricious claims presented in Hornbeck, the takings 
clause could serve as an alternative means for protecting 
against overly broad and unfairly burdensome regulations.  
The Supreme Court has established two main categories 
of unconstitutional takings: per se takings and regulatory 
takings.117 The two types require very different analytical 
approaches to determine whether a taking has occurred.118 
According to Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency,119 Hornbeck must be analyzed under 
the ad hoc balancing test established for regulatory takings in 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.120 
Traditionally, courts have been hesitant to find a taking under 
this framework in circumstances similar to Hornbeck.121 But, 
the ad hoc test courts have been applying is not ad hoc enough. 
These courts have failed to differentiate between the value 
taken in the case of land development moratoria (that 
  
 114 Defendants’ Response to Diamond Offshore’s Motion to Intervene at 3 n.4, 
Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010) (No. 
10-1663(F)(2)).  
 115 John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1003, 1006 (2003). 
 116 Id. at 1007 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 
(1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 117 Emily S. Newton, Executive Use of Private Claims to Strike a Public 
Bargain, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 487, 496 (2006) (comparing Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), with Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).  
 118 Id.  
 119 535 U.S. 302 (2002).  
 120 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
 121 See, e.g., Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1370-71 
(Fed. Cir. 2004).  
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temporarily affect the value of real property or a potential 
home, for example) compared to the value taken by moratoria 
on a service industry that relies on property rights with limited 
lifespans. In the former case, property values may continue to 
rise while the moratorium is in place, or, even if that proves 
not to be the case, full value should be restored upon rescission 
of the moratorium.122 In the latter circumstance, however, 
moratoria do not simply result in a temporary diminution in 
the resale value of the property. Instead, any rebound in value 
after rescission fails to mitigate the significant lost time and 
investment, potentially resulting in irreparable harm including 
the destruction of the industry entirely.123  
Despite the unsettled nature of takings jurisprudence 
and courts’ reluctance to engage in takings analysis, the more 
recent additions to the Supreme Court’s takings framework 
provide the opportunity for enforceable takings claims in these 
Hornbeck-like circumstances. In the interest of “fairness and 
justice,”124 the long-term threat posed by a moratorium and the 
nature of the property right at issue should be taken into 
greater consideration by courts as they apply the Penn Central 
balancing test. Thus, the circumstances that led to Hornbeck 
provide a tangible example of a claim that—based on the 
theoretical justifications for temporary takings law presented 
in Tahoe-Sierra—could be held a taking. 
A. Regulatory Takings and the Penn Central Balancing 
Test 
The text of the Takings Clause of the United States 
Constitution reads as follows: “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”125 This 
seemingly straightforward text, however, has proven 
exceedingly difficult in practice and application.126 Part of the 
problem stems from a lack of evidence indicating the Framers’ 
meaning behind the takings clause or the reasons for including 
it.127 Thus, courts have needed to flesh out the meaning and 
  
 122 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332, 341. 
 123 See Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Application for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, supra note 30, ¶ 33.  
 124 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342. 
 125 U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 126 Fee, supra note 115, at 1007. 
 127 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 134 (2005). “Precedents for the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause were 
relatively few in number and narrow in application . . . [and] the compensation 
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scope of the clause.128 One of the first cases to distinguish 
between physical and regulatory appropriation of property was 
Mugler v. Kansas,129 but it was the rise of the modern 
government and the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon130 
that really began to define the scope of the clause.131 
Pennsylvania Coal involved a mining company that had sold 
the surface rights of a plot of land but had expressly and 
contractually reserved the rights to remove any coal found 
under it.132 Subsequent to the sale, Pennsylvania passed a 
statute forbidding the mining of coal that would result in the 
subsidence of any structure used for human habitation, 
essentially voiding the contractual reservation.133 The Supreme 
Court determined that the statute made it commercially 
impracticable to mine the coal and had “very nearly the same 
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or 
destroying it.”134 Accordingly, the Court held that the statute 
was invalid because it amounted to a taking without just 
compensation.135 In a later case, the Supreme Court would 
describe Pennsylvania Coal as being the “leading case for the 
proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers 
important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-
backed expectations as to amount to a taking.”136 Thus, after 
Pennsylvania Coal it was clear that the Court would deem 
some legislative acts as going “too far” and rising to the level of 
a taking of private property.137 The obvious question that 
remained before the Court, and a question that still remains 
unsettled today, is how far is too far?138 More than fifty years 
later, in Penn Central, the Supreme Court would finally 
attempt to set forth a framework for answering that question.139  
  
requirement was not generally recognized at the time of the framing of the Fifth 
Amendment.” Id. Additionally, James Madison initially proposed the Fifth 
Amendment, but “[t]here are apparently no records of discussion about the meanings of 
the clause in either Congress or, after its proposal, in the states.” Id.  
 128 Id. at 136. Because of the lack of precedent in the area, most of the early 
Supreme Court decisions accorded with early state decisions. Id.  
 129 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
 130 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  
 131 Fee, supra note 115, at 1009. 
 132 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.  
 133 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). 
 134 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.  
 135 Id. at 414-15.  
 136 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S at 415.  
 138 See Fee, supra note 115, at 1010. 
 139 See generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.  
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The question presented in Penn Central was whether a 
city could, as part of a program to preserve historic landmarks, 
place restrictions on the development of these landmarks 
without the restriction amounting to a constitutional taking 
requiring payment of just compensation.140 The case again 
addressed the issue of regulatory takings, and the Court 
implicitly rejected the “proposition that a ‘taking’ can never 
occur unless government has transferred physical control over 
a portion of a parcel.”141 In a landmark decision, the Court 
established what would become known as the Penn Central 
balancing test, later described as a “multi-factor test for 
determining whether a regulation restricting the use of 
property effects a taking.”142 The test consisted of a case-by-case 
analysis of three factors143: (1) the economic impact of the 
regulation on the plaintiff; (2) the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct144 investment-backed 
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental 
action.145 The Court may have laid out the framework for 
regulatory takings, but the application of that framework to 
this day remains disjointed. In fact, critics have condemned it 
as being both “convoluted and seemingly arbitrary.”146  
B. Lucas and Its Progeny: Per Se Takings 
Although the evolution of takings jurisprudence now 
makes per se takings inapplicable to the case at hand, it is 
useful to briefly discuss this second category because previous 
cases147 have used such analysis under similar factual 
  
 140 Id. at 107.  
 141 Id. at 122 n.25.  
 142 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2603 n.6 (2010).  
 143 The Court never actually announced a specific set of factors to be used in 
the balancing test, but these three were “especially prominent” and were again cited by 
the Court a year later, solidifying their importance in regulatory takings analysis. 
Joshua P. Borden, Derailing Penn Central: A Post-Lingle, Cost-Basis Approach to 
Regulatory Takings, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 870, 875-76 (2010).  
 144 Later cases have changed the word “distinct” to “reasonable.” Christopher 
Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 
1251 (2009). The Court made this change without acknowledging any distinction 
between the terms, but the change has had tangible effects on subsequent courts’ 
analysis of takings claims. See id. “[T]his factor is now principally used to distinguish a 
property owner’s reasonable expectations from pie-in-the-sky development dreams.” Id.  
 145 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.  
 146 Borden, supra note 143, at 870-71 (exclaiming that “one cannot help but 
believe that a better, sounder, approach must exist”).  
 147 See, e.g., Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 120, 123 
(1999) (finding that a per se taking had occurred where government delay in deciding 
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circumstances. Shortly after instituting the Penn Central 
balancing test, the Supreme Court began to carve out 
exceptions that required a different analytical framework. 
These exceptions reflected circumstances where the claimant 
was automatically entitled to just compensation, without an 
“inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the 
restraint.”148 The per se takings exception to the Penn Central 
balancing test applies to the following: (1) takings that amount 
to a physical occupation of the property by the government and 
(2) regulations that result in the total loss of value of the 
property.149 The case that defined the first exception was Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., where the Court held 
that permanent physical occupation of property—even in the 
case of two measly four-inch by four-inch metal cable boxes—is 
always a taking, “without regard to whether the action achieves 
an important public benefit or has only minimal economic 
impact on the owner.”150 The Court justified its holding by noting 
that a permanent physical occupation destroys many strands 
from the “bundle of property rights” that have historically been 
protected by property law, including the right to possess, use, 
dispose, and exclude.151 It also noted that a balancing test was 
largely unnecessary because such cases present “relatively few 
problems of proof” compared with regulatory takings.152 
The second category of per se exceptions to the Penn 
Central balancing test—those regulations that deny all 
economically beneficial or productive use of the land—was 
defined in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.153 The 
Court noted that these types of regulations “carry with them a 
heightened risk that private property is being pressed into 
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating 
serious public harm.”154 Further, like permanent physical 
occupations, the Court explained, 
  
application to develop oil leases for a substantial period of time amounted to an 
absolute loss of value in the property during that time).  
 148 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).  
 149 Id.  
 150 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419-20 (1982).  
 151 Id. at 435 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); United States 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).  
 152 Id. at 437.  
 153 See generally Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003. The plaintiff in Lucas, an owner of two 
undeveloped parcels of land, argued that by passing a law barring the erection of any 
permanent habitable structures on certain beachfront property, the state legislature 
had taken his property and that he was thus entitled to compensation. Id. at 1009.  
 154 Id. at 1018.  
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We believe similar treatment must be accorded confiscatory 
regulations, i.e., regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial 
use of land: Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or 
decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in 
the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of 
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.155  
Thus, “[w]hen . . . a regulation that declares ‘off-limits’ 
all economically productive or beneficial uses of land goes 
beyond what the relevant background principles [of property 
and nuisance law] would dictate, compensation must be paid to 
sustain it.”156  
C. Temporary Takings and Moratoria: The Importance of 
Tahoe-Sierra 
The fact that a moratorium lasts for only a limited 
period of time157 is not fatal to a regulatory takings claim.158 
Instead, the duration of the restriction is only one factor for 
courts to consider.159 The Supreme Court has held that the 
“effect of a regulation must be measured against the ‘parcel as 
a whole,’” however the Court has failed to fully define this 
term.160 Earlier cases usually focused on the amount of physical 
or spatial portions of a land parcel impaired by a restriction to 
determine if a taking had occurred.161 The Supreme Court in 
  
 155 Id. at 1029.  
 156 Id. at 1030. The Court attempted to lay out a clear framework for per se 
takings analysis, stating: 
The “total taking” inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail . . . analysis 
of among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or 
adjacent private property, posed by the claimant’s proposed activities, the 
social value of the claimant’s activities and their suitability to the locality in 
question, and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided 
through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent 
private landowners) alike. 
Id. at 1030-31 (citations omitted). 
 157 In Hornbeck, the moratorium lasted less than six months, although at the 
time the claim was originally filed, there was concern that it might last much longer. 
First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 27, ¶ 54. 
 158 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 334-35 (2002).  
 159 Id. at 342.  
 160 Fee, supra note115, at 1029-30. 
 161 See Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Law Symposium: Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other “Exceptions” to Liability for Fifth Amendment 
Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the “Rule,” 29 ENVTL. L. 939, 948-53 (1999) 
(discussing how various cases have dealt with the fact that regulations “are three 
dimensional [and] have depth, width, and length” (quoting First English Evangelical 
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Tahoe-Sierra, however, focused on a different slice of the 
property—the temporal dimension affected by the regulation.162 
Specifically, the Court addressed the issue of how to analyze a 
temporary land development moratorium and how to 
determine if such a regulation could ever amount to a taking.163 
Unfortunately, because the Court answered the question by 
responding “neither ‘yes, always’ nor ‘no, never’,”164 the analysis 
is not exactly straightforward. The Court’s description of and 
focus on “fairness and justice” as central tenants of takings 
analysis, though, should provide at least some future takings 
victims the opportunity to bring a successful claim.165 
The Court in Tahoe-Sierra built upon the principle 
established in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, where the Court previously addressed 
temporary takings in general.166 The Court in First English 
held, “[W]here the regulation has already worked a taking of 
all use of property, no subsequent action by the government 
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period 
during which the taking was effective.”167 In that case, though, 
the Court was concerned with determining compensation once 
a taking had concededly occurred, and thus did not specifically 
address the threshold question of whether the temporary 
denial of land use had constituted a taking in the first place.168 
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court took that first step and established 
the framework to be used for analyzing temporary moratoria in 
the takings context.169 The Court rejected the petitioners’ claim 
that a temporary taking that resulted in the total deprivation 
of all economic use while the moratorium was in place was 
  
Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987)). At least in terms of physical 
restrictions, landowners are not permitted to conceptually sever individually affected 
segments from the property as a whole in order to argue that the use or value of these 
segments has been totally destroyed by the regulation. Fee, supra note 126, at 1030. Yet, 
courts have sometimes struggled in determining what the relevant parcel to be analyzed is 
in order to determine both whether a taking has occurred, and if so, how much 
compensation is required. See Meltz, supra note 110, at 72; Fee, supra note 126, at 1029-32.  
 162 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32.  
 163 Id.  
 164 Id. at 321.  
 165 See id. at 334; Steven J. Eagle, Planning Moratoria and Regulatory 
Takings: The Supreme Court’s Fairness Mandate Benefits Landowners, 31 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 429, 505 (2004).  
 166 See generally First English, 482 U.S. 304. 
 167 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 n.17 (1992) 
(internal brackets omitted) (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 321).  
 168 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 328. 
 169 See id. at 334-38.  
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subject to the per se takings analysis established in Lucas.170 
The Court worried that such a categorical rule would open the 
floodgates to takings litigation and would apply to even 
“normal delays in obtaining building permits . . . as well as to 
orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes.”171 
Rather, the Court stated that Justice Brennan’s “parcel as a 
whole” theory of takings analysis established in Penn Central 
must be applied to the temporal dimensions of a property the 
same way it applies to the physical dimensions.172 Accordingly, 
the Court held that the “better approach to claims that a 
regulation has effected a temporary taking requires careful 
examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances” by 
using the Penn Central balancing test.173 But, important to a 
Hornbeck-type scenario, the Court made it clear that “[i]n 
rejecting petitioners’ per se rule, we do not hold that the 
temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that 
it effects a taking.”174 Instead, “the duration of the restriction is 
one of the important factors that a court must consider in the 
appraisal of a regulatory takings claim . . . .”175 Further, 
throughout the opinion, the Court repeatedly referenced notions 
of fairness and justice as instructive to the holding.176 
The question of how long a restriction is too long is one 
that remains unclear and confusing. For instance, courts have 
held, “A permanent physical occupation does not necessarily 
mean a taking unlimited in duration. [Instead, a] ‘permanent’ 
taking can have a limited term.”177 Interestingly, many 
temporary regulations held to not constitute takings at all are 
longer in duration than the “permanent” deprivation that 
required application of the per se rule in Lucas.178 One thing is 
  
 170 Id. at 334.  
 171 Id. at 335 (citations omitted).  
 172 Eagle, supra note 165, at 445. Justice Brennan stated in Penn Central:  
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments 
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been 
entirely abrogated. . . . [T]his Court focuses rather both on the character of 
the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the 
parcel as a whole . . . . 
Id. 
 173 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 174 Id. at 337. 
 175 Id. at 342.  
 176 See id. at 321, 332-36; see also Eagle, supra note 165, at 505.  
 177 Eagle, supra note 165, at 456 (quoting Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United 
States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  
 178 See id. The delay in development in Lucas lasted only two years. Id.  
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clear, however: courts have tended to put great weight on the 
durational factor of temporary takings.179  
The impact of Tahoe-Sierra on takings jurisprudence 
cannot be overemphasized. For example, its effect can clearly 
be discerned from the two opposing decisions reached by the 
United States Court of Federal Claims in Bass Enterprises 
Production Co. v. United States.180 The litigation commenced in 
Bass Enterprises after the Bureau of Land Management denied 
the plaintiff lessees’ application to explore and drill for oil and 
gas on their leased property for forty-five months while the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined the 
environmental impact that such development posed.181 The 
Court of Federal Claims initially found a temporary (but per 
se) taking, stating, “Plaintiffs have not been permitted to use 
their leases for a substantial period of time. Their loss during 
that period was absolute.”182 The court cited Lucas, explaining 
that the limited duration of the regulation did not bar 
constitutional relief, and ordered damages in the amount of the 
interest that the plaintiffs would have earned on the oil and 
gas profits during the delay period.183 Following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Tahoe-Sierra, however, the government’s 
motion for reconsideration was granted.184 This time the Court 
of Federal Claims applied a Penn Central balancing test and 
found that “the economic impact on Bass was de minimis and 
that the Government’s delay was reasonable given the 
importance of protecting the public . . . .”185 After “[w]eighing 
the factors and the circumstances surrounding the delay as a 
whole,” the court concluded that there had not been a taking.186  
Bass Enterprises is an example of the heavy emphasis 
courts have placed on the duration of the delay when applying 
a temporary takings analysis following Tahoe-Sierra.187 
Accordingly, under a similar judicial application, Hornbeck, or 
  
 179 See Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (noting that an extraordinary delay in governmental decision making may 
constitute a taking, but citing delays of eight years, seven years, and forty months that 
were not held to be takings).  
 180 Compare id., with Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 120 (1999).  
 181 Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 381 F.3d at 1362-64. 
 182 Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 45 Fed. Cl. at 123. 
 183 Id. at 123-24. 
 184 Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 381 F.3d at 1364. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 1365. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims, 
holding that the delay was not extraordinary in duration and that the Penn Central 
factors were properly applied. Id. at 1370-71.  
 187 See id. at 1366-69. 
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plaintiffs similarly situated, may have difficulty bringing a 
successful takings claim despite the significant value that was 
lost—and which could not be recovered—during and following the 
moratorium. Still, this result may not be fair or justified based on 
takings law as it currently stands, and it therefore warrants a 
closer look. Additionally, while there are many factual similarities 
between Bass Enterprises and the circumstances leading to 
Hornbeck, there are enough distinctions to warrant further 
analysis.188 To begin this analysis, it is useful to look at how courts 
have previously treated takings claims in cases following 
moratoria on oil drilling. This examination will illustrate how the 
evolution of takings jurisprudence requires a different outcome 
here than was reached in both Bass Enterprises and these 
previous moratoria cases.  
IV. PREVIOUS CASES INVOLVING MORATORIA BY THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING OIL SPILLS 
Moratoria have been used by administrative agencies as 
a common means to “preserve the status quo while formulating 
a more permanent . . . strategy.”189 Moratoria have been 
employed in a wide variety of contexts, from use of the death 
penalty,190 to the prohibition of killing marine mammals,191 to 
the suspension of mining of valuable fossil fuels.192 Likewise, 
moratoria and regulations suspending operations involving 
gas, oil, and mineral rights have been the subjects of takings 
analysis in the past.193 In fact, the Deepwater Horizon incident 
is not the first time that the Department of the Interior has 
  
 188 See infra Part V.B. 
 189 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 337 (2002).  
 190 See Victor L. Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty for Juveniles, 61 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 72 (1998) (discussing the American Bar Association’s 1997 
resolution instituting a moratorium on death penalty jurisdictions “to correct several 
flaws and to afford greater fairness in the process”). 
 191 See Carol B. Koppelman, Anderson v. Evans: The Ninth Circuit 
Harmonizes Treaty Rights and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 HASTINGS W.-
N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 353, 368 (2010) (describing the 1972 moratorium against 
killing marine mammals). 
 192 See Sam Kalen, The Devolution of NEPA: How the APA Transformed the 
Nation’s Environmental Policy, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 483, 524 (2009) 
(discussing the Department of the Interior’s informal moratorium on new coal mining 
leases and permits until “the Department could develop a coherent approach to the 
leasing and development of the nation’s coal resources”).  
 193 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 
475-76 (1987); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 395 (1922); Pauley Petroleum Inc. 
v. United States, 591 F.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. Cl. 1979).  
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broadly suspended drilling rights via moratorium following an 
oil blowout.194 Nor is it the first time that⎯in response⎯a 
takings claim was brought by an aggrieved plaintiff.195  
The massive oil spill in Santa Barbara, California, in 
January 1969 spurred several cases that explored the property 
rights of leaseholders in the Santa Barbara Channel.196 The spill 
“caused severe property and environmental damage” and 
prompted the Secretary of the Interior to order all companies in 
the Santa Barbara Channel to cease all drilling and production 
regardless of their involvement in the spill.197 This line of cases 
focused on the authority of the Secretary to pass regulations that 
amounted to a taking and determined that the duration of the 
regulation was a requisite factor in determining that authority.198  
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, the Secretary of the Interior 
followed up the initial moratorium with a second one in 1971 
that was to last until 1973.199 He justified the second suspension 
by stating that it was necessary to give Congress time to 
consider whether it wished to pass legislation to terminate the 
leases in the interest of conservation.200 The plaintiffs in the 
case⎯who had paid $153 million for the leases⎯filed suit, 
seeking, among other things, declaratory judgment that the 
suspension was outside the scope of the Secretary’s authority 
and must be revoked.201 In addressing the first suspension the 
court declared that “[a]fter the leases in question were made, 
events occurred in the Santa Barbara Channel that were both 
unexpected and very dangerous to the environment . . . [causing] 
the Secretary to reconsider the dangers to the natural resources 
of the area if drilling were to proceed under the leases.”202 As 
was the case in Hornbeck, the case focused on whether the 
suspension was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the 
  
 194 See, e.g., Pauley Petroleum, 591 F.2d at 1312. 
 195 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1975).  
 196 See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1973); Union 
Oil, 512 F.2d at 743; Pauley Petroleum, 591 F.2d 1308. 
 197 Pauley Petroleum, 591 F.2d at 1312. 
 198 See generally Gulf Oil, 493 F.2d 141; Union Oil, 512 F.2d 743; Pauley 
Petroleum, 591 F.2d 1308. 
 199 Gulf Oil, 493 F.2d at 143.  
 200 Id. The decision was supported by the director of the United States 
Geological Survey, who noted that continued operation under the leases posed the 
following risks: “[T]he possibility of another blowout; the possibility that wells would be 
improperly plugged . . . should [they later be abandoned]; [and] the possibility that 
geologic structures such as the one which contributed to the 1969 spill would be 
encountered and fractured, thus causing large quantities of oil and gas to escape.” Id.  
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 146. 
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APA; the court, however, also touched on several aspects 
associated with a takings analysis, including just 
compensation.203 In addressing a possible takings claim, the 
court noted that in a letter accompanying the proposed bill to 
terminate the leases, the Secretary wrote that the legislation 
would “offer[] a mechanism for determining and paying just 
compensation to the lessees . . . .”204 The court held that 
“Congress authorized the Secretary to suspend operations 
under existing leases whenever he determines that the risk to 
the marine environment outweighs the immediate national 
interest in exploring and drilling for oil and gas.”205 The court 
also held that, since the lessees had not yet begun drilling, the 
circumstances at hand permitted a suspension while Congress 
weighed the merits of the proposed bill.206 The court cautioned, 
however, that the Secretary could not “continue to issue 
comparable orders one after another and justify them by 
repeatedly having his proposed legislation introduced in the 
Congress . . . at some point, if Congress does not act, there 
must be an end to the matter.”207  
The same facts that led to Gulf Oil spurred litigation in 
Union Oil Co. of California v. Morton.208 The Secretary of the 
Interior had initially granted plaintiffs the right to build a new 
floating drilling platform.209 But, following the spill, the 
Secretary announced that Union Oil would not be permitted to 
build the additional platform.210 Unlike Gulf Oil, which 
discussed a temporary suspension, the issue in this case was 
whether the Secretary had the power to permanently suspend 
the plaintiffs’ lease.211 The plaintiffs claimed that the Secretary 
had denied them the full exercise of their rights under their 
lease with the federal government212 and that the suspension 
amounted to a permanent taking without compensation.213 The 
  
 203 See id. at 146-47. 
 204 Id. at 147. 
 205 Id. at 144. 
 206 Id. at 146. 
 207 Id. at 148. Indeed, on petition for rehearing the court held that the bill had 
been before Congress for four sessions without any substantial action to push the bill 
forward towards law and that therefore the Secretary’s power to suspend the leases 
vanished on October 18, 1972. Id. at 149. 
 208 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 209 A provision in plaintiff’s lease specifically allowed for the erection of 
floating drilling platforms. Id. at 746. 
 210 Id. 
 211 See id. at 751. 
 212 Id. at 746.  
 213 Id. at 750.  
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court acknowledged that, while the Secretary had the authority 
to suspend the lease under certain circumstances,214 the 
executive branch had no intrinsic power of condemnation and 
thus could not suspend the lease indefinitely.215 Further, a 
suspension that “depriv[ed] Union of all benefit from the lease 
in that particular area” would be a permissible taking if 
enacted by Congress (as long as just compensation was 
provided), but was outside the scope of the Secretary’s power.216 
Accordingly, the court analyzed whether the Secretary had 
impermissibly taken Union’s property by determining whether 
the suspension was temporary or was instead an indefinite 
suspension amounting to a “pro tanto cancellation of [the] 
lease.”217 A suspension that was limited in time by the 
“occurrence of new events or the discovery of new knowledge 
which can be anticipated within a reasonable period of time” 
would not constitute a taking, according to the court.218 
Ultimately, the court determined that the facts were 
insufficient on the record to determine the answer to that 
question and remanded the case to the district court.219  
The Santa Barbara oil spill also led to Pauley Petroleum 
Inc. v. United States.220 In that case, the plaintiffs were a 
consortium of oil corporations who acquired leases from the 
federal government to explore and drill off the coast of Santa 
Barbara.221 In conjunction with the general moratorium, the 
Secretary promulgated a regulation relating to the level of 
liability for general lessees involved in oil spills.222 The 
Secretary also required all drilling companies in the area to 
submit “all geological, geophysical and structural information,” 
explaining that after this information was studied on a lease-
by-lease basis the companies would be permitted to resume 
drilling.223 The plaintiffs brought suit claiming, among other 
things, that the absolute liability requirement and clearance 
program amounted to a regulatory taking because it rendered 
their leases “economically worthless and exposed them to 
  
 214 Id. at 748.  
 215 Id. at 750 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).  
 216 Id. at 751.  
 217 Id.  
 218 Id. at 752.  
 219 Id.  
 220 591 F.2d 1308, 1308 (1979). 
 221 Id. at 1311-12. 
 222 Id. at 1312. 
 223 Id. at 1313. The lead plaintiff “delayed its response to this demand and 
never fully answered.” Id.  
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unmeasurable risks.”224 They argued that the regulation applied 
retroactively and imposed absolute liability for all cleanup 
costs as well as for any damage to third-party property caused 
by a spill.225 The court held that the power to suspend leases 
could not rise to such a level that it resulted in a total 
suspension of rights because the Secretary does not have the 
authority to take property.226 As was the case in Union Oil, the 
court determined that the plaintiffs had “fail[ed] to meet at 
least one of the prerequisites for a constitutional taking—the 
requirement that the taking be authorized by Congress.”227 
Thus, the plaintiffs could not bring a takings claim because the 
power to take property was solely vested in Congress, and did 
not extend to actions by the Secretary.228 According to the court, 
“Congress clearly did not intend to grant leases so tenuous in 
nature that the Secretary could terminate them, in whole or in 
part at will.”229 Further, the court noted that the “short, 
temporary suspension was plainly not so severe a property 
deprivation as to constitute a fifth amendment taking.”230 
Accordingly, the court held that a takings claim was not the 
proper means of recourse for the plaintiffs.231 Again the court 
required a regulation to be permanent and authorized by 
Congress for it to afford a valid takings claim.232 
Many of these cases share similar factual circumstances 
to the Hornbeck scenario. Despite this precedent, however, the 
outcome of a takings claim in Hornbeck, or future claims 
arising under similar circumstances, remains unclear. The 
courts in the Santa Barbara spill cases held that takings claims 
were precluded because the Secretary lacked authority to 
restrict property rights in this manner, often hinging that 
authority on the duration or permanence of the suspension.233 
This position is outdated, however, in light of subsequent 
precedent.234 The Hornbeck takings claim need not hinge on the 
  
 224 Id. at 1314. 
 225 Id. at 1313. 
 226 Id. at 1326. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. (citing Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
 229 Id. (citing Union Oil, 512 F.2d at 751).  
 230 Id. at 1327. 
 231 The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ other causes of action, which 
included breach of contract and mutual mistake claims. Id. at 1326 (citing Union Oil, 
512 F.2d at 751).  
 232 Id. 
 233 See, e.g., Union Oil, 512 F.2d at 751.  
 234 See David W. Spohr, “What Shall We Do with the Drunken Sailor?”: The 
Intersection of the Takings Clause and the Character, Merit, or Impropriety of 
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permanent versus temporary distinction because the duration of 
the regulation is now only a part of the more fully established 
regulatory takings framework.235 And any notion that only 
actions by Congress, and not those by a member of the executive 
branch, can amount to a taking is similarly misplaced in today’s 
analysis.236 Instead, “the Takings Clause bars the State from 
taking private property without paying for it, no matter which 
branch is the instrument of the taking.”237 Accordingly, it is 
necessary to analyze the Hornbeck claim under the more modern 
approach to temporary regulatory takings. Although the 
Supreme Court has attempted to clarify and establish a working 
framework for this area, Hornbeck illustrates how the unsettled 
state of takings jurisprudence has made some plaintiffs 
unwilling to bring these kinds of claims and courts hesitant to 
venture into such an analysis if provided an alternative.238 It is 
precisely because this area is still malleable, though, that 
plaintiffs and courts should look to the takings clause to protect 
worthy victims from regulations that go too far.  
V. AN AD-HOC ANALYSIS OF THE TAKINGS CLAIM IN 
HORNBECK 
A court may be hesitant to find a takings claim in 
Hornbeck, despite the expansion of takings jurisprudence since 
the Santa Barbara oil spills and facts that distinguish 
Hornbeck from Bass Enterprises. Such a result, however, is 
both unfortunate and undesirable, and should be modified in 
light of the concepts of fairness and justice discussed in Tahoe-
Sierra.239 Admittedly, there is still confusion and discord in 
takings law, but a proper reading of Tahoe-Sierra illustrates 
  
Regulatory Action, 17 S.E. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 21 (2008) (noting that “[a] legislative grant of 
authority to an agency to exercise discretion over various affairs could lead to acts by 
[executive] officials that were illegal but still within the [congressionally defined] scope 
of agency authority” (citing Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States, 146 F.3d 
1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002) (holding that the duration of a regulation is 
not dispositive regarding the takings question).  
 235 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335. 
 236 “The Takings Clause . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific branch 
or branches. It is concerned simply with the act, and not with the government 
actor . . . .” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2601 (2010) (discussing a judicial takings claim). 
 237 Id. at 2602. 
 238 See Meltz, supra note 110, at 73 (describing confusion as to when cases 
should be analyzed as a breach of contract instead of a taking and noting the general 
preference of the federal courts to take the breach of contract route if possible).  
 239 535 U.S. at 333-34. 
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the “considerable latitude” available to property owners to 
assert claims based on these concepts.240 The facts in Hornbeck 
provide an example of the danger for plaintiffs in a service 
industry who may be injured uniquely and significantly 
because of the permanent effects of a temporary regulation. 
Accordingly, these types of claims are worthy of relief under a 
more contextually inclusive three-part Penn Central analysis 
that looks at (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the 
distinct investment-backed expectations of the plaintiff; and (3) 
the character of the government regulation.241  
A. The Economic Impact of the Regulation  
The economic impact is a fact-specific question, and in 
the case of the Hornbeck plaintiffs it is immense in terms of 
sheer numbers. The plaintiffs alleged that the moratorium led 
to the termination of valuable service contracts with the oil and 
exploration companies in the Gulf of Mexico.242 Plaintiffs noted 
that lost job wages could be more than $330 million for each 
month the moratorium remained in place.243 Likewise, the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) predicted “that 
the moratorium would lead to the loss of more than 23,000 jobs 
in the . . . region and that oil and gas industry spending in [the 
Gulf would] be reduced by more than $10 billion.”244  
The leases,245 contracts, and vessels that constitute the 
property rights in the industry last for only a limited time, and 
thus it is difficult or impossible to recoup any lost expenses as a 
result of suspensions of operations.246 These effects can be 
distinguished from those imposed by moratoria in other 
  
 240 Eagle, supra note 165, at 505.  
 241 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  
 242 First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶¶ 58-67. The allegations were not mere conjecture; as 
early as June 2010 valuable contracts were being cancelled or reduced. See id.  
 243 Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, supra note 48, at 23. 
 244 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment at 14 n.13, Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, 2010 WL 
3973222 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2010) (No. 10-CV-01941). It was also reported that the 
moratorium would result in approximately $500 million in lost wages for workers in 
the oil industry. Steven Shavell, Should BP Be Liable for Economic Losses Due to the 
Moratorium on Oil Drilling Imposed After the Deepwater Horizon Accident?, 64 VAND. 
L. REV. 1995, 1999 (2011).  
 245 Complaint at ¶ 55(b), Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, 2010 WL 2812241 
(E.D. La. July 9, 2010) (No. 10-CV-01941).  
 246 Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, supra note 48, at 3.  
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contexts,247 and make the plaintiffs more worthy of relief 
considering the immense level of investment that they have 
made into both their own equipment and the industry as a 
whole in the region.248 Additionally, unlike in other contexts, the 
plaintiffs in Hornbeck do not enjoy any reciprocity of advantage 
that might mitigate the damage suffered when they are 
subjected to a stop-drilling order.249 Instead, for plaintiffs, and 
similarly situated companies, the harm suffered by moratoria 
is without any potentially positive consequences.  
Also, the final economic impact may be even greater 
than initial estimates suggested. The BOEM estimates were 
based on a six-month moratorium, but at the time the 
complaint was filed the moratorium was predicted to last much 
longer.250 Additionally, the Department of the Interior 
estimated that long-term job loss might significantly exceed 
BOEM’s initial estimates due to the potential relocation of rigs 
to other regions and the potential demise of some drilling 
companies.251 Those fears did not fully materialize (the 
moratorium did in fact end before six months), yet the lifting of 
the moratorium did not bring about an immediate end to the 
negative economic effects it created.252 Thus, the impact of the 
  
 247 See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.  
 248 Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, supra note 48, at 3-6. Regarding investments put into their own equipment, 
Diamond Offshore explained, for example, that the cost of one of its floating rigs can 
exceed $500,000 per day. Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Application for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, supra note 30, ¶ 10. Likewise, the value of the 
deepwater vessels built by plaintiff Bollinger Shipyard Company in the last five years 
exceeds $200 million. First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 38. 
 249 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 341 (2002). The Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra noted that all landowners in the 
community benefited from the moratorium because the development restriction also 
prevented their neighbors from engaging in unwanted development. Id. In fact, in that case, 
the moratorium might protect or even increase the property values in the area. Id.  
 250 First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 54. 
 251 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment at 14 n.13, Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, 2010 WL 
3973222 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2010) (No. 2:10-CV-01941-MLCF-JCW); Hornbeck’s 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 48, 
at 6 (explaining that “[w]hen a deepwater rig or vessel leaves a drilling region, it does 
so under a long-term contract and will not return for several years, if ever”). At least 
two deepwater rigs had left for foreign waters as early as July 2010. Hughes & Power, 
supra note 25. But see Daly, supra note 100 (noting that loss of jobs in the Gulf region 
is likely temporary).  
 252 People in the industry feared the possibility that a de facto moratorium 
would remain in place, which would extend the suspension of operations and increase 
the injury. See Matthew Daly, Administration Lifts Freeze on Drilling, Official Says 
New Rules Improved Safety, Cut Risks of Another Disaster, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, 
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regulation could potentially be felt far into the future. More 
importantly, future moratoria could last significantly longer, 
thus resulting in an even greater impact and illustrating the 
need for takings clause protection. 
B. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations 
The reasonable investment-backed expectations of 
plaintiffs affected by the moratorium provide several 
distinguishing characteristics from previous precedent that 
help support the finding of a taking. Whether a regulation 
results in a change to the status quo is an important factor for 
the Supreme Court in a takings analysis. For example, the 
Penn Central Court “hinted that it may have [ruled differently] 
if the . . . regulation had prevented [the property] from being 
used as it always had been.”253 Thus, it is more reasonable for 
parties to expect their permits and contracts to continue 
unhindered once they have obtained all necessary 
authorizations and drilling has already commenced. The 
plaintiffs here are not seeking to develop property beyond its 
current state; rather, they simply seek to continue using their 
property as they have for many previous years. Similarly, they 
are not seeking an initial permit to begin utilization of their 
property by exploring and drilling for oil, as was the case in 
Bass Enterprises.254 Accordingly, while the delays in both Bass 
Enterprises and Hornbeck stemmed largely from the need to 
protect against a “possible environmental and health hazard,”255 
only the Bass Enterprises delay resulted in an 
extension⎯rather than a disruption⎯of the status quo.  
The facts in Bass Enterprises represent a situation 
where the plaintiffs had more reason to expect delays than do 
the plaintiffs in Hornbeck. In Bass Enterprises, the lease in 
question was above a portion of an underground nuclear waste 
storage site.256 The delay was imposed while the EPA 
  
Oct. 13, 2010; see also Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, No. 10-1663, 2011 
WL 454802, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011). In fact, several months after the moratorium 
was lifted, drilling permits were still not being issued. Id. at *2. 
 253 ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 127, at 197. Further, the Supreme Court 
noted that the type of moratoria at issue in Tahoe-Sierra was one that is routinely used 
to preserve, not disrupt, the status quo. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337.  
 254 See Bass Enters. Prod. Co v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 255 Id. at 1367. The court in Bass Enterprises noted that such a situation 
justifies delay because “we do not want to ‘encourage hasty decisionmaking’ by the 
Government.” Id.  
 256 Id. at 1362. 
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determined if it was necessary to condemn and obtain the 
leasehold in its entirety to protect the integrity of the site.257 Thus, 
it was unknown whether any safe use of the lease could ever be 
engaged in by the leaseholder.258 In contrast, the leases and 
contracts in Hornbeck were for rigs that had recently passed 
inspections and had been deemed to conform to all safety 
regulations by the MMS.259 Also, there had been no similar 
blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico since 1969.260 Thus, there was little 
reason to anticipate another spill. Instead, it was more reasonable 
to expect that as long as the parties continued to comply with all 
safety regulations they would not suffer any delays.  
Likewise, although “delay is inherent in complex 
regulatory . . . schemes,”261 such a delay is more reasonably 
expected when operations have not yet commenced. The 
decision to allow drilling on a portion of a site designated for 
nuclear waste storage required careful deliberation to 
determine the effects on the site as a whole. The Bass 
Enterprise plaintiffs had knowledge that these regulations 
were in place before they began any drilling activities. Thus, 
they should have expected that they might not immediately be 
granted the use of their lease, and such a delay would do 
nothing to alter the status quo. Like the disposal of nuclear 
waste, the oil industry is highly regulated;262 still, the oil rigs in 
Hornbeck had conformed to these regulations and procedural 
requirements and had previously been operating safely and 
without issue.263 There was little reason for the plaintiffs to 
expect any change to these operations, barring individual 
safety violations by the rig operators. Thus, by banning the 
operation of all oil rigs, the broad moratorium seriously 
disrupted the status quo, unfairly burdened innocent parties, 
  
 257 Id. at 1363.  
 258 Additionally, the Bass Enterprise plaintiffs had the security of knowing 
they would be compensated if the government determined drilling to be permanently 
unsafe because the federal government would then condemn the property and pay just 
compensation. See id. at 1362-63.  
 259 First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 46. Twenty-seven of twenty-nine recently inspected 
rigs had no violations; the other two had only minor violations. Id.  
 260 See Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 638 n.11 
(E.D. La. 2010).  
 261 Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 381 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Wyatt v. United States, 
271 F.3d 1090, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 262 Takings are generally less likely to be found in industries that are highly 
regulated. Meltz, supra note 110, at 66. This alone does not bar all takings claims 
though. Id. at 67. 
 263 First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 46.  
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and destroyed the investment-backed expectations of the oil 
service industry in the Gulf.  
Further, in determining the safety of oil exploration and 
drilling, Congress has provided an expectation that the 
Department of the Interior will proceed expeditiously.264 The 
relatively short time frame of thirty days that Congress has 
allowed for the agency to approve exploration plans submitted 
under OSCLA265 supports a reasonable expectation of freedom 
from extended delay in the industry. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable for plaintiffs with property interests in the oil 
industry in the Gulf of Mexico to expect government-imposed 
delay not to last much longer than thirty days. The length of 
the moratorium here far exceeded that expectation.  
A similar argument draws support from dicta in Tahoe-
Sierra. In acknowledging that considerations of “fairness and 
justice” were the touchstone of moratoria aimed at curbing 
abusive land development, Justice Stevens indicated that, 
under the right circumstances, the Court could “craft a 
narrower rule that would cover all temporary land-use 
restrictions except those ‘normal delays’” associated with the 
industry or application process.266 There is little precedent for 
what constitutes a normal delay as it applies to moratoria on 
drilling following an oil spill. Oil drilling resumed under 
heightened standards following the Santa Barbara spill, 
however, after only about two months.267 Therefore, it is 
reasonable for the plaintiffs to expect that their investment in 
the Gulf would not be disturbed by the government for any 
substantially longer duration.268  
In contrast, a takings argument is weakened by the fact 
that the moratorium officially lasted less than six months, a 
very short period of time compared with other delays that have 
  
 264 See In re Core Commc’ns., Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
 265 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c) (2006). 
 266 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 333 (2002) (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)); see also Eagle, supra note 165, at 442. The Court determined 
that such a rule “would certainly have a less severe impact on prevailing practices,” but 
cautioned that “it would still impose serious financial constraints on the planning 
process.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337.  
 267 See Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 1308, 1312, 1314 (Ct. 
Cl. 1979). The Secretary immediately requested that drilling operations cease when the 
spill occurred on January 28, 1969. Id. at 1312. The Secretary gave approval to 
recommence operations on April 1, 1969. Id. at 1314. 
 268 Although the moratorium officially lasted only about five months, the 
added regulations imposed by the government prevented operations from resuming for 
longer. Daly, supra note 100; see also supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
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been held to not be takings.269 Although the economic impact 
was drastic and potentially devastating to companies in the oil 
drilling and exploration business in the Gulf of Mexico, these 
companies should be able to regain most of the value of their 
leases in time, now that the moratorium has been lifted. Yet, 
for those service companies that rely on other entities that 
have left for foreign waters, this reassurance is not nearly as 
comforting.270 Moreover, the Tahoe-Sierra Court justified its 
refusal to find the temporary restriction in that case to be a 
taking by explaining, “[l]ogically, a fee simple estate cannot be 
rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, 
because the property will recover value as soon as the 
prohibition is lifted.”271 This assertion may be true in the case of 
temporary planning/development restrictions on real estate (as 
was the restriction at issue in Tahoe-Sierra), but it fails to 
account for the significant loss in value imposed in the present 
situation. Unlike the Tahoe-Sierra landowner, many companies 
in the oil industry rely on property interests that amount to 
less than a fee simple estate. Instead, their property interests 
are vested in contracts272 and support vessels that have a 
limited useful life.273 Accordingly, the higher the percentage of 
these useful lives consumed by the moratorium, the more likely 
a court should be to find a taking.274  
Finally, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra articulated that the 
petitioners had failed to offer a persuasive account of why 
moratoria should be treated differently from ordinary permit 
delays.275 Further, the Court condemned the petitioners’ claim 
  
 269 See Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). The Supreme Court has indicated that while the length of the moratorium is not 
dispositive, the longer the delay, the more likely a taking has occurred. See Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341 (“It may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for more 
than one year should be viewed with special skepticism.”).  
 270 Only two of the thirty-three deepwater oil rigs left the Gulf for other fields, 
but this result could have been much worse if the first moratorium had not been 
enjoined in Hornbeck. See Cynthia A. Drew, The Gulf Deepwater Drilling Moratorium: 
While Merits Still Pending, Already Significant Practical Effect?, ENVTL. L. REP. (2010), 
available at LEXIS, 40 ELR 11137. Future plaintiffs who do not have the ability to 
enjoin regulations under alternative means may not be as lucky. See supra Part IV.  
 271 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332.  
 272 Complaint at ¶ 1, Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, 2010 WL 2812241 (E.D. 
La. July 9, 2010) (No. 10-CV-01941).  
 273 Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, supra note 48, at 2.  
 274 See Eagle, supra note 165, at 473.  
 275 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337 n.31. 
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as being too broad when brought as a facial challenge,276 leaving 
open the possibility that petitioners may have succeeded on an 
as-applied claim.277 Here, the shortened lifespan of the property 
interests at issue provides this kind of persuasive reasoning. 
Additionally, as applied to this case, there is another clear 
reason why a moratorium is different and indeed more 
burdensome than a normal permit delay⎯the long-term 
potential to lose existing business contracts and clients 
permanently to other regions of the world. This type of threat 
is unique to the context of property interests that may move, 
terminate, or disappear in response to government action, such 
as the mobile deep-water oil rigs that are the source of business 
for the Hornbeck plaintiffs. 
C. The Character of the Government Regulation 
The final Penn Central factor is the “character of the 
governmental action.”278 It is not entirely clear what the Court 
had in mind when it described this factor, although it might 
have been an “attempt to separate out physical invasions from 
all other types of regulation or [an] attempt to distinguish one 
subset of permissible regulations from others.”279 Some courts in 
the past have given this factor significant weight and have 
appeared unwilling to find a taking where the moratorium is 
clearly a regulatory action that “arises from some public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good.”280 More recently, however, the 
Court has been reluctant to place much weight on this third 
factor and has explicitly rejected any analysis looking into 
whether the regulation serves a public purpose.281 Accordingly, 
the third Penn Central factor may now mean little more than 
whether the government action is characterized as physical as 
  
 276 Id. at 334; see also Eagle, supra note 165, at 464, 470, 501 (noting that the 
Court’s hand in ruling was largely forced by procedural issues of the case such as the 
way the challenge was phrased and presented).  
 277 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334.  
 278 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 279 Eagle, supra note 165, at 449. “The need to more readily characterize the 
physical invasion as a taking lasted only for four years [until the holding in 
Loretto] . . . .” Id.  
 280 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Some courts have also looked for evidence of 
bad faith on the part of the government in determining whether a taking has occurred. 
See Eagle, supra note 165, at 476. Such an inquiry is no longer appropriate, though, 
under Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005).  
 281 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 532 (holding that the “substantially advances” for a 
legitimate public use test is inappropriate for takings analysis).  
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opposed to regulatory, and will need to be more clearly defined 
by future court decisions.  
Ultimately, any court deciding the outcome under 
factual circumstances similar to the Hornbeck case would need 
to weigh all these circumstances282 to determine whether the 
magnitude of the government’s interference with the plaintiffs’ 
property rights was so severe that it required compensation. 
Despite many persuasive arguments and facts supporting the 
finding of a taking in Hornbeck, it is unclear whether the 
plaintiffs could have succeeded in their takings claim. Courts 
have exhibited a tendency to put strong emphasis on the length 
of temporary moratoria and have displayed a general 
reluctance to find temporary takings.283 Nonetheless, Hornbeck 
provides an interesting example illustrating the arguments 
that are available to future plaintiffs subjected to similar 
regulations, at a time in the future when takings jurisprudence 
has begun to accept and apply the interests in fairness and 
justice articulated in Tahoe-Sierra.284  
CONCLUSION 
The limited focus on a potential takings claim by the 
parties in Hornbeck illustrates that this area of law is still very 
much uncertain and in flux. Yet, future plaintiffs need not view 
this uncertainty as a problem. Instead, it should be seen as 
providing increased flexibility, allowing individual plaintiffs to 
shape persuasive arguments based on their specific 
circumstances. A more factually inclusive and flexible approach 
to the current takings framework would provide better 
protection and induce the government to more thoroughly 
internalize the consequences of regulations that may go too far.  
Critics have complained that “[t]he persistence of 
incoherence, instability and incomplete explanations in this 
area of the law suggests that the [Supreme] Court itself is 
dissatisfied with the tests it has developed, yet is unable to 
produce a more satisfying jurisprudence.”285 Accordingly, there 
have been numerous proposals for both the expansion and 
  
 282 Significantly more facts from both sides would certainly be desirable, but 
presumably these would be presented in a case that involved a takings claim advanced 
more assertively than in Hornbeck.  
 283 See generally Meltz, supra note 110.  
 284 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 321, 334 (2002).  
 285 Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2003). 
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contraction of the scope of protection provided by the takings 
clause. On one side of the argument is Richard Epstein, who 
has recommended a dramatic expansion of takings protection.286 
According to Epstein, the “government must compensate for 
every diminution in value it causes to owners by restricting the 
use of property beyond inherent common law limitations.”287 On 
the “other end of the spectrum, Peter Byrne has argued 
that . . . [b]eyond physical intrusions, the regulatory takings 
doctrine should be abolished.”288 Because Tahoe-Sierra 
expressly left open the prospect of “as applied” challenges to 
moratoria, there is room for the case law to move towards 
either end of the spectrum.289 A takings analysis based on the 
specific circumstances of each case, determined through a more 
contextually inclusive application of Penn Central, would 
establish an appropriate middle ground. Indeed, such an 
application seems to embody the language used in Tahoe-
Sierra, where the Court explained, “we are persuaded that the 
better approach to claims that a regulation has effected a 
temporary taking ‘requires careful examination and weighing 
of all the relevant circumstances.’”290  
Yet the courts have been overly reluctant to find takings 
due to a rigid application of the Penn Central test. There are 
inherent differences between the temporary regulation 
discussed in Tahoe-Sierra and regulations like the oil drilling 
moratorium that warrant an end to this reluctance. Thus, 
instead of applying a single rule for all moratoria, courts 
should look at how that moratorium is affecting the property 
right at issue. Courts must account for the fact that temporary 
regulations place a greater burden on property interests in the 
oil service industry⎯because of their limited duration⎯as 
compared to property interests in other settings. This is 
especially true in a case like Hornbeck where the property 
interests are movable and may not return if prohibited for too 
long.  
Including these contextual circumstances in a Penn 
Central analysis would more closely adhere to the theories 
behind takings protection discussed in Tahoe-Sierra. Such an 
application would prevent the government from unfairly 
  
 286 Fee, supra note 115, at 1015. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. at 1016. 
 289 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334.  
 290 See id. at 335 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
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burdening plaintiffs in service industries; it would also, at a 
minimum, result in more thoughtfully crafted regulations by 
forcing the government to internalize the possibility of 
compensation. Further, it would not prevent the government 
from instituting moratoria when absolutely necessary, but 
would simply require payment to those unfairly or 
disproportionately burdened by those regulations. Finally, 
adopting a more context-specific application seems appropriate 
as a concession to the ill-defined state of modern takings law. 
Doing so would allow courts to worry less about futile attempts 
to decipher and rigidly apply this jurisprudence and more 
about finding a result that is fair and just.  
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